The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time by Griffith, Aaron M.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Arts & Sciences Articles Arts and Sciences 
Spring 2017 
The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time 
Aaron M. Griffith 
College of William and Mary, amgriffith@wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/aspubs 
Recommended Citation 
Griffith, Aaron M., The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time (2017). JOURNAL OF SOCIAL 
PHILOSOPHY, 48(1). 
10.1111/josp.12180 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Articles by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more 
information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
The Rights of Future Persons and the Ontology of Time
Aaron M. Griffith
1. Introduction
Many are committed to the idea that the present generation has obligations
to future generations, for example, obligations to preserve the environment and
certain natural resources for those generations. However, some philosophers
want to explain why we have these obligations in terms of correlative rights that
future persons have against persons in the present.1 Attributing such rights to
future persons is controversial, for there seem to be compelling arguments
against the position. According to the “nonexistence” argument, future persons
cannot have rights (and so should not be attributed rights) because they do not
exist. According to the “no-satisfaction” argument, future persons cannot have a
right to resources that do not exist at the time of their existence because such a
right could not, in principle, be satisfied. In this paper, I will argue that an eter-
nalist ontology of time provides the resources for satisfactorily responding to
both the nonexistence and the no-satisfaction arguments.2
Eternalism is a prominent view of time that is defended by a number of
metaphysicians.3 The eternalist understands the world in time to be a “block uni-
verse,” that is, a four-dimensional space-time manifold containing times that are
related to each other by the tenseless relations being earlier than and being later
than. Eternalists think that time is similar to space in a crucial respect: being
temporally remote from this moment makes no more difference to the ontologi-
cal status of an object than being spatially remote from this location does for the
ontological status of an object. Consequently, past, present, and future objects
all exist and are equally real on eternalism. To say that past and future objects
exist, is not to say that they exist presently. Instead, the eternalist holds that past
and future objects exist tenselessly, which is to say that they exist at the times
they do (either earlier than or later than this one) in exactly the same manner
that objects existing at this moment do (cf. Fiocco 2013, 216).
Eternalists claim a number of advantages for their view over competing
ontologies of time like presentism, the view that only present objects exist,4 and
growing block theory, on which past and present, but not future, objects exist.5
Unlike its competitors, eternalism is said to be able to account for (i) cross-
temporal relations, (ii) the reference of terms (apparently) denoting nonpresent
objects, and (iii) plausible truthmakers for past and future contingent truths.
Some eternalists argue that it is the only ontology of time that is consistent with
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the special theory of relativity.6 Of course, whether eternalism enjoys these
advantages exclusively is disputed.7 These debates need not concern us, howev-
er, for I intend to argue here that if eternalism is true, then two key arguments
against attributing rights to future persons can be convincingly rebutted.8 In the
conclusion of the paper, I will consider some of the ramifications the truth of
eternalism would have for debates about intergenerational ethics.
The two arguments that are the focus of this paper are not, I should note, the
only arguments against grounding present persons’ obligations in future persons’
rights. The much discussed “nonidentity” problem developed by Thomas
Schwartz (1978), Robert Merrihew Adams (1979), Gregory Kavka (1981), and,
most forcefully, by Derek Parfit (1987, 351ff.) poses a challenge for any view on
which we would have obligations to future persons whose existence and identity
are contingent upon our decisions, but whose lives would be unavoidably flawed
in some way. Although a full defense of the view that future persons have rights
will have to answer the nonidentity problem, I will not be addressing the problem
here. The present effort makes a contribution by removing two other basic road-
blocks to attributing rights to future persons, which pose a challenge to a theory of
intergenerational rights, whether or not the nonidentity problem proves intracta-
ble.9 I turn now to the nonexistence argument and the eternalist response to it.
2. The Nonexistence Argument
The nonexistence argument is the most common argument given against
attributing rights to future persons. Some authors take the argument to be the cen-
tral and decisive blow to views attributing rights to future persons.10 The crux of
the argument is that future persons cannot have rights (and so should not be attrib-
uted rights) because they do not exist. Here is Richard De George’s formulation
of the argument:
Future generations by definition do not now exist. They cannot now, therefore, be the pre-
sent bearer or subject of anything, including rights. Hence they cannot be said to have rights
in the same sense that presently existing entities can be said to have them. This follows
from the briefest analysis of the present tense form of the verb “to have.” (1981, 159)
Echoing De George, Wilfred Beckerman and Joanna Pasek offer a similar argument:
[Future persons] do not exist . . . by definition, future persons have not yet arrived. (2001, 19)
Thus the general proposition that future generations cannot have anything, including
rights follows from the meaning of the present tense of the verb “to have.” Unborn people
simply cannot have anything. (2001, 16)11
Other variants of the argument deny rights to future persons on the grounds that
such persons have a diminished ontological status, being merely potential, mere-
ly possible, and so on.
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According to Ruth Macklin,
The chief argument in support of the position that future generations cannot correctly be
said to have rights rests on the premise that the ascription of rights is properly to be made
to actual persons—not possible persons. Since future generations can only be viewed as
consisting of possible people, for any vantage point at which the description “future peo-
ple” is applicable, it would follow from the aforementioned premise that rights cannot
properly be ascribed to future generations . . . Even if we believe that there will be such
actual persons in the future, their rights cannot be said to exist until they (the persons)
exist. (1981, 151)
The formal argument implicit in these quotes seems to be as follows:
(i) Future persons do not exist (are not actual).
(ii) If x does not exist (is not actual), then x cannot bear rights.
(iii) Therefore, future persons cannot bear rights.
The argument begins with a claim about the ontological status of future persons,
namely that they lack existence (or actuality). Premise (ii) states that existing
(or being actual) is a necessary condition for having rights. It assumes (a) that
having a right involves or entails having certain properties or standing in certain
relations and (b) the truth of the following principle: necessarily, an object x has
property F or stands in relation R to something only if x exists.12 Given (i), (ii),
and assumptions (a) and (b), it follows that future persons cannot have rights. If
they cannot have rights, then they do not have rights. Hence, it is inappropriate
to attribute rights to future persons.
2.1. Eternalism and the Nonexistence Argument
Eternalism, we said, is the view that past, present, and future objects and
times exist and are equally real. Past and future objects tenselessly exist at the
times at which they do. Let “EXISTS” denote tenseless existence and
“HAVING” denote the tenseless having of a property, that is, an object’s having
a property at the time at which it EXISTS. Given this framework, it is straight-
forward how the eternalist will respond to the nonexistence argument. She will
deny premise (i), that is, deny that future persons have the demoted ontological
status her interlocutor says they do. For her, future persons EXIST at times later
than this one and are no less real, existent, or actual for this. Independently of a
metaphysical assumption that the eternalist rejects, viz., that future persons do
not exist, an “analysis of the present tense form of the verb ‘to have’” (De
George 1981, 159) does nothing to show that future persons do not have rights.
Such an analysis is irrelevant to the eternalist who holds that future persons
EXIST at times later than this one and HAVE rights at those times.
Proponents of the nonexistence argument endorse (i) because they tend to
assume that for a person to exist is for her to exist presently. On the basis of this
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assumption, they reason that for a person to have a right is for her to have that
right presently. Of course, the eternalist agrees that future persons do not exist
presently (for it is incoherent to say “future persons now exist,” if that means
that a person who only EXISTS at times later than this one, also EXISTS at this
time). But she does think they EXIST and can affirm that EXISTENCE, but not
present existence, is a necessary condition for having a right. Because our eter-
nalist thinks that future persons EXIST at times later than this one and HAVE
rights at those times, her defense of the attribution of rights to future persons
does not depend on the implausible claim that future persons now exist and now
have rights.
Moreover, the eternalist might hold that future persons HAVE rights at the
times at which they EXIST and some of those rights entail correlative duties for
people in the present. That is, S2 may have a right R at t2 and R is correlative
with a duty D had by S1 at an earlier time t1. This gives us an eternalist response
to the following argument from Beckerman and Pasek:
Suppose somebody had made preparations to set off a bomb in, say, two hundred years’
time, or buried some radioactive nuclear waste in an unsafe location. This would harm a
lot of people who do not yet exist. But it would be wrong to say that their rights not to be
harmed had been violated. For since they did not exist when the delayed-action bomb
was planted they could not be said to have any rights. (2001, 17–18)
On eternalism, a person need not exist at the time an action is performed for that
action to help constitute a violation of her rights. If a person EXISTS and is
harmed by the exploding bomb at a later time t2, we can say that the planting of
the bomb at the earlier time t1 helps constitute a violation of the rights of the
person EXISTING at t2.
Dennis Earl (2011) argues that future persons have no rights against present
persons. In arguing this, he claims that eternalism cannot help us resolve the fol-
lowing inconsistent triad: (I) Future generations have rights; (II) Future genera-
tions do not exist; (III) In order for X to have rights X must exist. All of these
claims, says Earl, are prima facie plausible, yet they are incompatible and so
generate a paradox. Eternalists attempt to resolve the inconsistency by denying
(II), for they think that future persons EXIST. However, Earl claims that resolv-
ing the inconsistency this way equivocates on the meaning of “exists” in (II),
which he takes to mean “presently exists” (2011, 64). Technically speaking, the
eternalist does not equivocate on the meaning of “exists.” Eternalists and pre-
sentists can agree that there is a single meaning of the existential quantifier;
what they disagree about is whether any nonpresent objects are the values of
bound variables. Nevertheless, if we read “exists” as Earl suggests, that is, as
“presently exists,” then the eternalist will now affirm (II) and deny (III). For she
thinks that one can have rights even if one EXISTS at a time other than this one;
present existence is not necessary for having rights on eternalism. Earl’s triad,
then, only appears to be inconsistent if we assume that to exist presently is to
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exist simpliciter. This is a presentist assumption that the eternalist rejects. So
Earl has not presented a compelling case to the eternalist for thinking that (I)
rather than (II) (or (III)) is the culprit of the triad.13
3. The No-Satisfaction Argument
Defeating the nonexistence argument does not entail that future persons
have rights against presently existing persons, even in the eternalist framework.
Premise (ii) of the nonexistence argument is a necessary, but not sufficient, con-
dition for someone’s having a right. Depending upon the right in question, vari-
ous other conditions may need to be satisfied. For example, the possession of
certain legal rights requires a person to occupy some “office” or “position,” such
as being a citizen of certain country or being of a certain age, and so on. Some
think a more general condition on having any right whatsoever is that it be logi-
cally possible to satisfy the right. That is,
Satisfaction: A person P has a right R only if it is logically possible to satisfy R for P.14
Satisfaction is a plausible condition on having a right. It does seem that no
one can have a claim on or an entitlement to something it is logically impossible
for her to have. A right that is logically impossible to satisfy would require the
bearer of the correlative duty to do something logically impossible. But it is
widely held that no one is obligated to do something that she cannot do.15 If that
is right, then no one has a right that is logically impossible to satisfy. Satisfac-
tion, moreover, can be used to generate another argument against attributing
rights to future persons, one that poses a challenge to the eternalist. Even if
future persons exist, they cannot correctly be attributed rights if those putative
rights would be logically impossible to satisfy.
Versions of the no-satisfaction argument are found, again, in Beckerman
and Pasek (2001) and De George (1981). The former argue that future persons
cannot have a right to oil, gas, coal, or clean water if such resources do not exist
by the time future persons come into existence (2001, 16). The reason they can-
not have such a right is that once those resources go out of existence, it is not
“in principle” possible to satisfy the (putative) right. They compare attributing
rights to future persons to resources that do not exist at the time of their exis-
tence to attributing a right to a child, “Tommy,” to a toy that was just destroyed
by another child, “Billy.” Tommy, they claim, may have a right to compensation
from Billy, but because the toy no longer exists, we cannot say that he has a
right to that very toy, since it is impossible to satisfy such a right for Tommy.
Similarly, De George writes, “[a being] has a right only to the kind of treatment
or to the goods available at the time of its conception. It cannot have a reason-
able claim to what is not available” (1981, 160). His reason for thinking that no
one has a right to what is not available at the time of her existence is,
62 Aaron M. Griffith
presumably, that such a right could not be satisfied. The formal no-satisfaction
argument behind these remarks seems to be this:
(iv) A person P has a right R only if it is logically possible to satisfy R
for P.
(v) It is logically impossible to provide future persons with particular
resources that have been used up by the time of their existence.
(vi) Therefore, no future person has a right to resources that have been
used up by the time of her existence.
Premise (iv) is, obviously, Satisfaction. The notion of “satisfying a right” in (iv)
should be understood broadly to include anything that would discharge the obliga-
tion correlative to the right, for example, by providing what the right gives its
bearer a claim to or by the bearer waiving the right. (v) needs to be treated with
some care. I take it that it is not to be read as “There is no possible world in which
future persons enjoy certain resources that, in the actual world, have been used up
by the time of their existence.” Instead, it ought to be understood, as the argu-
ment’s proponents seem to intend it, in light of the assumption that the past is
fixed, that is, if an event e has taken place, then it is true that e has taken place
and will remain true regardless of what events occur after e has taken place.
Hence, if the resources thought to be owed to future persons have been used up or
wasted by the time of their existence, there is nothing that can be done at that time
to satisfy their rights, since no one has any power to change what happened in the
past. So understood, (v) implies that at the time of their existence, it is logically
impossible to satisfy the rights future persons are alleged to have to certain resour-
ces. Together with (iv), (v) entails the conclusion, (vi).
If successful, the no-satisfaction argument would only show that future per-
sons have no rights to particular resources. But one might think that future per-
sons have rights against present persons, not to particular resources, but to the
benefits those resources produce16 or to general conditions required for living
and thriving, for example, having clean air and water, having consistent and reli-
able food sources, and so on. Such a concern could be accommodated, however,
by amending (v) to refer to such benefits and conditions rather than particular
resources. For our purposes, nothing turns on which version of the no-
satisfaction argument we opt for; the eternalist response presented in the next
section is equally as effective against both versions.
3.1. Eternalism and the No-Satisfaction Argument
Satisfaction, (iv), let us assume, is a necessary condition on having a right.
But are proponents of the no-satisfaction argument correct in thinking that future
persons cannot satisfy this condition with respect to present resources? In response
to the argument, the eternalist should first insist that (v) be made more precise.
The question “is it logically possible to satisfy R for P?” has no answer unless it is
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indexed to a time. It may be impossible at t2 to prevent an event e from taking
place at an earlier time t1, yet it might be possible at t1 (or a time earlier than t1)
to prevent e from taking place. To say that it is impossible at t2 to prevent e is,
again, not to say that there is no possible world that includes e in a history up to
t2. It is to say that at t2, the past is closed, that nothing can be done at t2 or later
can make it the case that e did not occur. However, at t1, it is open whether event
e will take place or not, which is to say that it is unsettled or indeterminate at t1
whether e will take place at t2.
17 If this is correct, then determining whether a per-
son P meets the condition on having right R expressed by (v) turns on what the
appropriate time of evaluation is for the logical possibility of satisfying R for P.
Proponents of the no-satisfaction argument tend to assume that rights and
their correlative duties are always had at the same time. (This is likely due to the
fact that most of those thinking about the moral status of future persons assume
that only the present is real, which entails that there is only one time at which any
rights and duties are had.) The eternalist should say that the time at which a right
R is HAD need not be identical to the time at which R’s correlative duty D is
HAD. Thus, future persons can HAVE rights at the times at which they EXIST,
while the duties correlative to those rights are HAD by persons EXISTING at ear-
lier times. The reason we should “locate” rights and duties at the times at which
their bearers exist is that those rights and duties depend for their existence and
normative force on their bearers.18 If, for example, we said that person P is the
bearer of right R, but that P does not exist, there would seem to be no way to
explain why R belongs to P, that is, why R is P’s right in particular. Moreover, if
P does not exist, there would seem to be no way to explain why R would generate
any obligation for another person(s). For if there is no one who is entitled to some-
thing or who has a claim to something, then it is difficult to explain how anyone
would be obligated, in virtue of that right, to satisfy that right.
Once it is acknowledged that rights and their correlative duties can be located
at different times, the eternalist can argue that proponents of the no-satisfaction
argument are wrong to think that the appropriate time at which to evaluate whether
it is possible to satisfy the rights of future persons is the time at which those persons
exist. It is the earlier time at which D is HAD, and not the later time at which R is
HAD, that is the appropriate time at which to evaluate whether it is logically possi-
ble to satisfy R for its bearer. The reason for this is that the bearers of D are the
ones obligated to satisfy the demands of R. No one, let us suppose, is obligated to
do something that it is logically impossible for them to do, which is why the ques-
tion of whether a person has a right to something is (partially) decided by whether
it is logically possible for the person(s) who have the correlative duty to meet the
demands of the right. Hence, even if (v) is true, it is irrelevant to whether future per-
sons have rights against present persons. What matters is whether it is possible to
satisfy the rights of future persons at the time at which the correlative duty is had,
namely the present. At the present time, it certainly is logically possible to provide
future generations with at least some things to which they may have rights, for
example, clean water, clean air, and certain natural resources.19 The sense in which
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this is possible is that the future is open; it is open to the present generation to pre-
serve certain natural resources and conditions for life for future generations.
This eternalist response is effective against De George’s claim that the
resources future persons are said to have a right to are not available to them. The
eternalist can agree that no one, including future persons, can have a right to what
is not available in the sense of not EXISTING, that is, not existing at any time.
But she does not think that the resources under consideration are unavailable to
future persons in this sense. She holds that these resources EXIST, though at an
earlier time than future persons do. They are available to future persons insofar as
the present generation—those who have a duty to future generations—can do
something to help secure those resources for future generations.
The response also shows why Beckerman and Pasek’s (2001, 17) analogy
between the rights of future persons to resources and Tommy’s right to his toy
breaks down. Let us grant that Tommy does not have a right to his original toy.
Once Billy destroys the toy, it is not possible for Tommy’s putative right to the
toy to be satisfied; it is impossible for Billy to do anything to satisfy this putative
right, hence Tommy has no such right. Unlike Tommy and Billy, however,
future persons and present persons are not contemporaries. The duties that pre-
sent persons are said to have to future persons are had at a time when those
resources exist, that is, at a time when it is possible for them to be preserved for
later generations. So unlike Billy, it is possible for present persons to satisfy the
rights with which they are thought to have correlative duties.
Eternalists, we said, emphasize the similarity between space and time. The
following analogy can help make sense of the eternalist response to the no-
satisfaction argument. Suppose you are 100 miles from home. You have a right to
your home and to the possessions contained therein. Your possessions are not
available to you to make use of at your spatial location, since they are 100 miles
away from you. But that makes no difference to your right to them, nor to the cor-
relative duty I have not to burn down your house and everything inside. I can help
provide you with the possessions you have a right to by not destroying them. Like
spatial remoteness, temporal remoteness does not preclude persons from having
rights to things at different times than the times at which they exist. Just as I can
help secure your rights at a spatial distance, so too can the present generation help
provide future generations with the resources to which they have a right at a tem-
poral distance. The eternalist should, therefore, be in full support of Ernest Par-
tridge when he says, “Time does not diminish the prima facie force of duty,
although it may be conjoined with a diminished certainty or efficacy of one’s
attempt to fulfill that duty. In such cases the factors of probability, efficacy, and
deliberative choice, as such, not time, are morally relevant” (1990, 48).
4. Conclusion
Above I addressed two central arguments against attributing rights to future
persons. I argued that adopting an eternalist ontology provides a framework in
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which to successfully respond to the arguments. Key to the eternalist response
to these arguments is the commitment to the tenseless EXISTENCE of future
persons, who may be bearers of rights at the times at which they exist. I want to
conclude by briefly considering some of the ramifications for our thinking about
intergenerational ethics if eternalism is the correct ontology of time and there
EXIST future persons/generations.
First, it would provide an underappreciated source of support for rights-based
and, more generally, individualistic approaches to intergenerational ethics, for
example, those that make use of person-affecting conceptions of harm.20 Even
those on which our obligations are directed at future communities or generations
rather than future individuals find support from eternalism.21 What eternalism
offers is an ontology in which cross-temporal normative relations are intelligible.
This would help explain how we could have obligations to or obligations directed
at future persons/generations.22 For if future persons/generations actually EXIST,
then they are, other things being equal, eligible to be among the relata of normative
relations, for example, having a duty to A (or not-A) toward X and having a right
to A (or not-A) against X, that hold across times. The truth of eternalism would,
moreover, help explain the possibility of those obligations in terms of the actual
interests of those particular persons/generations rather than purely general and
impersonal moral principles.23
Second, if eternalism is true and there are persons/generations EXISTING at
times later than this one, then it is a determinate fact about our world that there
ARE persons/generations at times later than this one who HAVE interests, rights,
and may be harmed. Such persons/generations are not merely possible, nonexis-
tent, indeterminate, or unactualized. Even if we are ignorant of their identity and
number, they are as real and determinate as we are. And insofar as present persons
can act in such a way that the interests and rights of such persons are affected, pre-
sent persons would seem to incur obligations to those particular future persons/
generations. Prima facie, this would challenge any view that alters or weakens our
future directed obligations on the basis of the (allegedly) diminished ontological
status of the future,24 because such views would be (explicitly or implicitly) draw-
ing on noneternalist conceptions of the future for their plausibility.
Obviously, more would need to be said to defend or rebut the views men-
tioned here. Nevertheless, what the foregoing shows is that our ontological com-
mitments regarding time ought to be factored into our theorizing about our
obligations to the future. For if the arguments of this paper are correct, then eter-
nalism offers proponents of intergenerational rights an ontological framework
that can be used to undermine key arguments against their position.
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Notes
1 I assume that to have a right is to have a valid claim to something and against someone. Having a
right entails someone’s having a correlative duty or obligation to satisfy the right. But while
every right entails a duty, not every duty entails that someone possesses a correlative right (cf.
H. L. A. Hart 1955; Joel Feinberg 1970; John Rawls 1972, 108ff.). Annette Baier (1981), Avner
de Shalit (1995), Robert Elliot (1989), Joel Feinberg (1974), Ori J. Herstein (2009), Norbert
Hoerster (1991), Ruth Macklin (1981), Lukas Meyer (2016), Ernest Partridge (1990), Galen K.
Pletcher (1981), Bruce Reichenbach (1992), Eugene Schlossberger (2008), and James Sterba
(1980) all hold that future persons may be attributed rights against the present generation.
2 I should note that W. V. O. Quine (1987, 74–5) seems to have been the first to connect eternalism
with the question of our obligations to future persons. The argument of this paper is in line with
his brief remarks on the matter.
3 See Robin LePoidevin (1991), David Lewis (1986), D. H. Mellor (1981, 1998), Hermann Minkow-
ski ([1908] 1923), Nathan Oaklander (2004), Daniel Peterson and Michael Silberstein (2010),
Hilary Putnam (1967), W. V. O. Quine (1960, 1987), Theodore Sider (2001), J. J. C. Smart
(1949), Robert Weingard (1972), and Donald Williams (1951) for defenses of eternalism.
4 John Bigelow (1996), Craig Bourne (2006), Thomas Crisp (2003), M. Oreste Fiocco (2007),
Mark Hinchliff (2000), Ned Markosian (2002, 2004), Trenton Merricks (1994, 1995, 1999),
Arthur N. Prior (1959, 1967), and Dean Zimmerman (1996, 2005, 2008) defend presentism.
5 C. D. Broad (1923), Peter Forrest (2004, 2006), and Michael Tooley (1997) defend the growing
block view.
6 See, for example, Sider (2001), Michael C. Rea (2003), Lawrence Sklar (1985), Ferrell Christensen
(1981), and Putnam (1967).
7 See Kristie Miller (2013), Ned Markosian (2004), and Ned Markosian, Meghan Sullivan, and Nina
Emery (2014) for overviews of the debates.
8 Hence, I would not be arguing here that presentists and growing block theorists cannot account for the
rights of future persons. However, I have argued elsewhere (see Griffith n.d.) that the various
attempts to attribute rights to nonexistent future persons are unconvincing, for example, those of de
Shalit (1995), Elliot (1989), Herstein (2009), Hoerster (1991), Meyer (2016), Partridge (1990),
Pletcher (1981), Reichenbach (1992), Schlossberger (2008), and Sterba (1980). In a nutshell, I con-
sider the challenge of attributing rights to nonexistent future persons to be a particularly intractable
case of the general problem that “cross-temporal” relations pose to those who deny the existence of
nonpresent objects. Rea (2003), Matthew Davidson (2003), and Giuliano Torrengo (2006, 2010)
pose the problem of cross-temporal relations for presentists. See M. Oreste Fiocco (2007), Marko-
sian (2004), Crisp (2005), and Rafael De Clercq (2006) for presentist defenses.
9 See M. A. Roberts (2015) for an overview of the nonidentity problem and putative solutions. See
James Woodward (1986), Doran Smolkin (1999), Rahul Kumar (2003), and David J. Velleman
(2008) who offer rights-based approaches to the nonidentity problem. As far as I know, no one has
approached the nonidentity problem from the perspective of the different ontologies of time.
10 Beckerman and Pasek (2001, 16) and Macklin (1981, 151) make this claim.
11 Hillel Steiner (1983, 159) and Herstein (2009, 1181) offer similar arguments.
12 Macklin’s argument does not trade on this assumption, only on the assumption only actual persons
can have rights against actual persons.
13 In fairness to Earl, he admits that if eternalism is true, then the paradox can be resolved by denying
(II) (2011, 64), which is consistent with the thesis of this paper. At any rate, Earl’s discussion
suggests that an important factor in determining the way out of the (alleged) paradox is what
ontology of time is correct.
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14 Beckerman and Pasek (2001, 16), De George (1981), and Parfit (1987, 356) endorse this condition.
15 However, see Walter Sinnott-Amstrong (1984), Schlossberger (2008), and Moti Mizrahi (2009),
among others, who deny that ought implies can.
16 See Partridge (1990, 62) and Douglas MacLean (1983, 5).
17 Which is not to say that the state of the world at t2 (or the world considered atemporally) is unset-
tled or indeterminate. See Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron (2009, 293, 305ff.; 2011) for this
conception of the open future.
18 Even some who think that the rights of future persons can exist without bearers hold that such
rights are “contingent upon” the future existence and interests of those persons. See, for exam-
ple, Elliot (1989, 161), de Shalit (1995, chap. 5), and Reichenbach (1992, 214).
19 Cf. Elliot (1989, 167) and Partridge (1990, 54).
20 Such a conception says, roughly, an act is wrong only if that act harms an actual person (present or future).
See Molly Gardner (2016) who defends a related principle partly by appeal to eternalism.
21 Herstein (2009) thinks we have obligations to future generations but not future individuals. Com-
munitarian approaches intergenerational ethics would be included here.
22 See Earl (2011, 71) and Pletcher (1981) on directed and nondirected obligations.
23 Certain forms of utilitarianism and virtue ethics make use of such principles. See Parfit (1987,
378ff.), Peter Singer (2011, 107ff.), and Temkin (1993, 221ff.) for discussions of impersonal
conceptions of harm in relation to the nonidentity problem.
24 For example, Beckerman and Pasek (2001), De George (1981), Earl (2011), Macklin (1981), and
Steiner (1983). It would also challenge views that seek to explain our future-oriented duties in
exclusively impersonal terms.
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